Thursday, April 26, 2018
Room 524, Lowenstein Center Lincoln Center Campus, Fordham University
113 West 60th Street, New York City
Doors Open 6 p.m.
Presentation 6:15 p.m.
Kindly register by Friday, April 20. Seating is limited.
In the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, senior policymakers and the media blamed excessive risk-taking by bank executives—undertaken in response to their compensation incentives—for the crisis. The inevitable follow-up to this was to introduce stronger financial regulation, in the hope that better and more ethical behavior could be induced. Despite the honorable intentions of regulation, such as the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, it is clear that many big banks are still deemed too big to fail. This book argues that by restructuring executive incentive programs to include only restricted stock and restricted stock options with very long vesting periods, and by financing banks with considerably more equity, the potential of future financial crises can be minimized.